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1. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES
The Sahel vision statement for agriculture in the 21
st century focuses on modernization through
the intensification of production using improved inputs; improved management of the natural
resource base (soils, forests, water); better integration of crop, livestock, and forestry activities;
and a transition from government-run markets to markets run by economic operators who are
supported by governments that provide the institutional, legal, and policy support necessary for
the private sector to compete effectively in national, regional, and international markets. Moving
toward the realization of this vision statement requires that governments take stock of where
they are at present and what needs to be done in the future.
The objective of this paper is to review progress made and challenges remaining as Sahelian
governments and entrepreneurs work together to develop the input markets that are so essential
to the modernization of Sahelian agriculture. The paper is designed to inform Sahelian decision
makers. Because the most important purchased input in the Sahel is currently inorganic fertilizer,
the paper focuses on fertilizer markets. In an effort to provide Sahelian decision makers with
information on a broad range of options, we have drawn on experiences throughout W. Africa
rather than focusing only on the Sahel. Numerous references to experiences in the Coastal
countries of W. Africa not only provide Sahelians with some perspective on how their
experience compares to that of other W. African countries, but also contribute to an
understanding of the opportunities and constraints to developing regional input markets.
Developing input markets is a major challenge throughout Africa, not just in the Sahel.
Although the topic of this paper is input market development, both economic theory and past
experience are clear about the link between input and output markets%the former cannot be
developed without substantial progress in the latter; farmers must be able to market their
production profitably if they are to have the incentive and the resources to pay for modern
inputs. This creates a dilemma for the many Sahelian farmers whose production remains focused
on traditional cereals that are grown primarily for home consumption and forces us to look
closely at the links between input and output markets as we review progress made to date and
challenges remaining.
The review is divided into three principal sections: 
Incentives for and Trends in W. African Input Use;
A Critical Review of Recent Input Market Developments in W. Africa;
Key Challenges for Sahelian Governments.2
2. INCENTIVES FOR AND TRENDS IN W. AFRICAN INPUT USE
2.1 Incentives and the Productivity Gap 
The conventional wisdom is that there is a productivity gap%large differences in average returns
to labor and yields per hectare%between farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and those in the
rest of the developing world. Some believe it is due to the low productivity of the technologies
currently available while others argue that high performing technologies are available but not
being used because of inadequate financial incentives and access. There is a tendency for
Sahelians to think that these yield gaps are greater in their countries than elsewhere in SSA,
because of the region's past history with repeated droughts and its heavy reliance on millet and
sorghum (food crops that do not respond as well to improved technologies as maize, rice, and
export crops). 
A recent compilation of fertilizer response data from research and demonstration trials shows
that there are many situations where the technologies available in SSA (including the Sahel)
perform as well (and sometimes better) than technologies available in Asia and Latin America
(Yanggen et al.). Table 1 is a comparison of key indicators of fertilizer response and profitability
for W. Africa, East and Southern Africa, and non-African regions of the developing world taken
from Yanggen et.al. Three ratios are used in the table:
(1) Output/nutrient (O/N) ratios showing the number of kgs. of additional output a
farmer obtains from a kg. of fertilizing nutrient;
(2) Input/output price (I/O) ratios showing the number of kgs. of output required to
purchase one kg. of fertilizer;
(3)  Value/cost (V/C) ratios showing the value of additional output attributable to
fertilizer divided by the cost of the fertilizer (a rudimentary indicator of
profitability).
There are some rules of thumb for interpreting these ratios. An O/N ratio ￿10 for cereals is
considered a strong incentive for fertilizer use. An I/O ratio <2 is generally attractive to farmers;
the lower the ratio the greater then incentive for fertilizer use. Conventional wisdom holds that
the V/C ratio must be greater than 2 for farmers to adopt a technology; in risky environments,
the minimum acceptable V/C is thought to be 3 or even 4.
Among the cereal crops covered in Table 1, maize (SSA's largest fertilizer consumer) and
irrigated rice exhibit the strongest incentives. O/N and V/C ratios exceed those for Latin
America, while the rice ratios are comparable to the Asian examples. Yields per hectare are
high: 2-4 tons for maize and 4-6 tons for rice. On the down side, maize profitability is threatened
by high yield variability (across sites and seasons) and by unfavorable I/O price ratios. The
existence of high performing maize and rice technologies for SSA suggests that producers of
these crops should make a substantial contribution to the growth in African fertilizer demand,
yet a substantial share of African maize and rice continues to be grown without fertilizer.3
Sorghum and millet exhibit poor incentives compared to maize and rice. Research data show that
using fertilizer in combination with crop residues, manure, or water and erosion control
considerably increases the yield response, but aggregate output is usually <1 ton/ha. Without
some major breakthroughs in technology performance, it is unlikely that millet and sorghum
producers will provide much stimulus for increased fertilizer demand.
Among the export crops covered, only tea%a crop whose production is limited to a few areas in
SSA%exhibits good indicators. Cotton has highly variable yield response and mediocre
profitability (V/C ratios) despite extremely favorable I/O ratios. Nevertheless, cotton is the
second largest consumer of fertilizer in SSA and the largest in W. Africa. As will be discussed in
Section 3, mediocre price and response incentives for cotton are compensated for by other
benefits associated with the closed nature of the input distribution system and the interlinking of
the credit and output markets.
Across all crops covered in Table 1, the I/O price ratios for SSA tend to be higher than those in
other parts of the world. This is due both to low output prices and to very high fertilizer prices.
Fertilizer price comparisons from the early 1990s reported SSA prices in the $232-487 range
compared to $68-201 for equivalent fertilizers in Asia (Bumb and Baanante).
Turning to more specific country-level examples from W. Africa, Tables 2-4 present trends in
average annual yields and inter-annual variability in yields (coefficient of variation or CV), for
three of the most important fertilizer using crops in the region: cotton, maize, and rice. This
information is paired with country-specific information on yield potential (based on research
trial results) and O/N ratios when available. The tables are completed with a few illustrations of
comparable information from maize, rice, and cotton producing countries in Asia.
For rice we note that although average yields in W. Africa lag behind yield potential and Asian
yields, O/N ratios for W. Africa are frequently >10 and as good or better than those in Asia. The
hypothesis that yield variability is greater in the Sahel than the Coast is not supported by the data
presented (the three lowest W. African CVs are for Sahelian countries), but the CVs for W.
Africa are substantially higher than those for Asia. 
For maize the average yields in W. Africa lag behind the yield potential and Asian yields. The
W. African O/Ns for maize are generally stronger than those for Asia, suggesting that the
incentives to use fertilizer on maize in W. Africa would be greater than in Asia if price ratios
were similar. Although the best O/N are found in Ghana, we note that the O/Ns for the Sahelian
countries of Mali and Gambia are higher than the O/N for the Côte d'Ivoire, suggesting that
fertilizer response is not necessarily better in Coastal climates. Coastal countries also do not
appear to have consistently higher average yields or lower variability.  
For cotton, W. African yields lag behind Asian yields for all countries but India and yield
variability is generally greater in W. Africa than in the Asian examples. Within W. Africa, the
CV ranges from 66 to 191 for Coastal countries and from 88-273 for Sahelian countries,
suggesting that production risk for cotton may be a greater problem in the Sahel than on the4
coast. Information on cotton yield potential and O/N ratios is too incomplete to draw any
inferences.
The key lessons that we draw from information presented in Tables 1-4 is that (1) there is a yield
gap when average annual Sahelian and Coastal W. African yields are compared to potential
yields and to Asian yields, (2) in the case of rice and maize, this yield gap cannot be explained
by lower O/N ratios (i.e., poor fertilizer response), (3) there is no clear pattern of Sahelian
countries facing greater production risk (higher CVs for average annual yields) than their
Coastal neighbors, but the W. African yield variability is generally greater than the Asian. Given
the low aggregate fertilizer use in SSA, the high production risk coupled with the unfavorable
I/O ratios (Table 1) appear to weigh more heavily in farmers decisions about fertilizer use than
the relatively good fertilizer response. The challenge is for W. African countries to develop
policies and institutions that encourage farmers to use more fertilizer on these fertilizer-
responsive crops.
2.2 Trends in Input Use
Many SSA countries%including those in the Sahel%experienced growth in the use of modern
inputs during the1970s and early 1980s. However, the government-financed structures
supporting the adoption of these technologies proved to be inefficient and financially
unsustainable, contributing to huge government deficits that led to extensive economic reform
programs.  During and immediately following the reform period both input use and agricultural
productivity were down in many countries. There has been substantial debate in the development
literature concerning the extent to which economic reforms%many implemented only
partially%aided or hindered development in the agricultural sector (Donovan, Donovan and Casy,
Husain and Faruqee, Jayne et al.). 
As we enter the 21
st century%almost 20 years after the earliest reforms were initiated%there are
signs that input use is returning to pre-reform levels. In West Africa, some of the best growth in
fertilizer use (in terms of annual rates of growth and consistency of the growth over time) has
been in Sahelian countries (Mali and Burkina Faso, in particular); however, SSA input use (9
kg./ha.) continues to lag far behind levels used in Asian (80 kg./ha.) and Latin America (54
kg./ha.) and progress remains slow given the urgent need to close the productivity gap described
above.
Table 5 presents data on fertilizer consumption trends for 16 W. African countries. We contrast
average consumption and growth rates for 1980-1989 with those for 1990-1997. As indicated in
the 'trend' column of the table, 63% of the countries experienced increased growth rates from the
1980s to the 1990s and 69% increased absolute levels of consumption. Thirty-eight percent have
exhibited what we would call sustained growth since 1980 (i.e., positive growth rates in both
periods and consumption levels in the late 1990s that exceeded earlier levels): Benin, Burkina
Faso, Chad, Togo, Guinea (Conakry) and Mali. An important point made by Table 5 is that there
is no obvious distinction between the input market performance of Sahelian countries versus the
Coastal countries of W. Africa. This suggests that the agroecological characteristics that unite5
the Sahelian countries may not be as important factors in the develoment of input and output
markets as the policies and investments used to promote market development. In other words,
the constraints to input market development may not be the same in Coastal and Sahelian
countries, but the mix of performance results presented in Table 5 suggests that neither set of
constraints poses an absolute barrier to input market growth. 
The discussion below will show that although recent input use trends are particularly favorable
in Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali, the recent trends are highly dependent on a few factors that
may not be adequate to ensure long term sustainable growth of input markets.
3. CRITICAL REVIEW OF INPUT MARKET DEVELOPMENTS IN W. AFRICA
3.1 Cotton Is Driving Input Demand Throughout W. Africa
3.1.1 The cotton subsector stimulates fertilizer use
The most salient characteristic of the fertilizer markets that have achieved high levels of
consumption (20,000 tons or more) and relatively sustained growth during the 1990s is their
location in the CFA franc zone and their dependence on the cotton sector. The 1994 devaluation
of the CFA franc, coupled with an increase in world market prices for cotton, stimulated a cotton
boom that resulted in rapid expansion of cotton area and demand for cotton fertilizers and
pesticides (Tefft 1998). Rough estimates suggest that cotton production accounted for 80% or
more of fertilizers used in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Benin during the 1990s, so continued growth
in these input markets remains heavily dependent on what happens in the cotton sector. The
importance of cotton goes beyond these countries because cotton is also among the top fertilizer
users in countries such as Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, Cameroon and Guinea.
Why is cotton production such an important stimulus for input demand?
1.  Output price risk is low because (a) there is a guaranteed market for cotton, (b)
producer prices are generally announced at planting time, and (c) producers are
protected from extreme fluctuations in world prices by price stabilization
schemes;
2.  Credit is generally available to cotton producers for both inputs and animal traction
equipment;
3.  Some cotton schemes provide extension and inputs for cereal crops.
How can the cotton companies provide all these services and continue to remain profitable?
1. Credit and output marketing activities are tied together in a closed system that
minimizes farmers' ability to default on credit;
2. Large quantities of inputs are ordered in bulk and vertical integration of many
subsector functions provide economies of scale;1For example, opening up imports to competing suppliers and permitting
farmers'associations to reduce costs by assuming responsibility for some distribution functions
(transport, placement, etc.).
2The extent to which OHVN administrative personnel and resources are being used to
support the supply of CMDT inputs was not discussed in documents reviewed, but OHVN is
providing credit guarantees for farmers who are unable to obtain input credit  through farmers
associations.
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3. Cost  reductions have been realized as producers associations assumed some of the
transport, input distribution and cotton collection activities formerly performed
by the cotton company;
4. The monopoly position of cotton companies permits them to pass through to farmers a
smaller share of the world market price than would be the case with competitive
out-grower schemes and, therefore, to cover costs of services delivered plus
profits.
3.1.2 Pros and Cons of Stand-Alone Cotton Input Systems
Despite some efforts to liberalize the cotton input supply systems in Francophone W. Africa,
1
documents reviewed and personal communications from individuals knowledgeable about the
cotton sector confirm that the cotton companies continue to control most aspects of input
acquisition and distribution.
Mali provides an example of private sector fertilizer dealers having made an unsuccessful
attempt to provide inputs to cotton farmers in the OHVN zone. Because cotton is not produced
as extensively in the OHVN zone as it is in the CMDT zone, fertilizer demand was smaller and
the private sector was unable to benefit from the economies of scale realized by the CMDT. The
high level of vertical coordination across functional categories also helps the CMDT to keep
costs down. The net result was that fertilizer sold by private dealers was more expensive than
that sold by CMDT in their zone of operation (southeastern Mali). OHVN officials were
ultimately pressured into supplying their cotton farmers with fertilizers obtained through the
CMDT system. This put the private traders out of business and forced the OHVN (a government
entity) back into the input business (OHVN 1999). Farmers are better served by the current
arrangements but these arrangements merit careful monitoring to ensure that the prices offered
OHVN farmers are not being maintained by hidden subsidies that will be unsustainable as the
demand for cotton inputs grows in the OHVN zone.
2
In Benin, liberalization of fertilizer imports began in 1991 but according to Badiane et al.
(1997), SONAPRA (the cotton company) and the Ministry of Agriculture maintained a heavy
regulatory role, controlling who could import and how much could be imported, specifying the
distribution of each importer's fertilizer quota to specific regions, and fixing prices. In June
2000, the GOB agreed to lift the monopoly of SONAPRA on seed cotton marketing. Currently,
discussions are underway to define a new credit mechanism that will ensure adequate seed cotton7
marketing with timely payment to cotton producers and input credit recovery (Ahouissoussi,
personal communication).
Another way in which the cotton companies might be constraining the development of national
input supply systems is by keeping their procurement completely separate from fertilizer
procurement for other production systems. To date there has been inadequate analysis of this
issue. The question is: Do the benefits of the current stand-alone systems outweigh potential
benefits that could be realized by consolidating imports of cotton inputs with those for other
sectors? For example, could consolidation of urea orders at the national level for cotton and
other crops (rice and maize in particular) lead to some economies at the import and distribution
level that are presently not possible given the current structure of the cotton company input
systems. Theoretically, this is something that importers or an importers' association could
attempt if there were some effort on the part of input users (cotton companies, rice producers'
associations, maize farmers) to coordinate the timing of their bidding procedures. 
Some question has also been raised about the specifications for the NPK fertilizers ordered by
the cotton companies, suggesting that lower-cost specifications might be adequate (Diouf et al.)
The issue is not only the fertilizer cost but also the decision process which doesn't promote
consultation between the cotton company and others having an interest in fertilizer procurement
and use.
A final concern about the cotton sector is the manner in which the inputs are being used. The
underlying argument for promoting fertilizer is to improve land productivity and reverse the
secular decline in soil fertility throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. It appears that although the CFA
devaluation stimulated rapid expansion of cotton area and aggregate growth in production and
input use, fertilizer doses per hectare have declined (Tefft 2000). The consequence has been
declining cotton yields%a worrisome scenario from both a soil fertility and a productivity
perspective (see Table 6 for W. African cotton yield and production trends).
There is no simple answer to the question of whether the benefits of stand-alone cotton input
systems outweigh the costs. It appears that Benin will be serving as a test case for a transition
from a closed, monopolistic cotton system to a more open competitive system with respect to
both input and output marketing%a transition that the Sahelian countries should follow closely. A
less drastic approach than the Benin case might be one of developing tools to better discipline
the existing monopolies while developing the institutions necessary to enforce credit
reimbursement in open systems without monopolistic output markets. The main constraint to
disciplining both monopolies and farmers who fail to reimburse credit is the lack of a reliable
regulatory system (i.e., an honest, non-corrupted judiciary and bureacratic/administrative
system). Sahelian governments need to develop institutions to ensure that cotton company
benefits are being shared equitably by all participants in the subsector and that all participants
are able to participate in decisions that affect them. At the same time, systems need to be put into
place to ensure that farmers are adequately sanctioned when they fail to meet their contractual
obligations (see section 3.2.2 for further discussion of this issue).8
3.2 Closed Input Distribution Systems Provide Important Benefits
3.2.1 General characteristics and selected examples
Closed input distribution systems are characterized by a set of linked procedures that (1)
centralize demand for a large group of farmers, (2) purchase the entire quantity demanded
through an international bidding process, and (3) distribute the inputs to the farmers. Most, but
not all, closed systems also provide seasonal credit to farmers purchasing inputs (Debrah 1999). 
The most common examples of closed input distribution systems are the cotton schemes
discussed above, but there are many other closed systems supported by government development
projects, NGOs, and the private sector.
Following the 1994 CFA devaluation, horticultural production grew in many countries as
import/export firms became involved in setting up out-grower schemes. Farmers in the OHVN
zone of Mali entered into green bean contracts with firms providing inputs and guaranteeing
output markets in France. Senegal expanded horticultural production and exports in a similar
manner. Potato farmers in the Sikasso Region of Mali benefitted from contracts offered by a
firm supplying inputs and marking output in Bamako. Prior to devaluation, a Burkinabé
cooperative working in a closed system had cornered a large share of West Africa's green bean
exports to France. In the Senegalese Peanut Basin the closed system used by the confectionery
peanut program was the only source of input credit during most of the 1990s because the
traditional input/credit program for oil peanuts was abandoned following massive and repeated
defaults. 
Although these closed systems have had a positive impact on input use and generally exhibit
higher rates of credit repayment than open systems, all of the systems mentioned above have run
into difficulties in the recent past. We find no consistent pattern to explain the problems
encountered. Malian green bean producers were left with warehouses full of beans this year
because the exporter never came to collect the output (apparently a problem of inadequate
supply of the type of packaging required for export to France) (personal communication, Djiré).
Potato farmers in Sikasso complain of exhorbitant input prices and extremely low producer
prices%both set by the same company which has a monopoly position in the zone (Kergna and
Koné). After many years of expanded production and high rates of credit repayment, the
confectionery peanut program in Senegal has fallen on hard times. Most analysts attribute the
current problems to a failure to maintain seed quality for the most profitable variety (GH 119-
20); the result has been that production now fails to meet export standards for the "hand pick
selected" category. Efforts to continue exports for lower quality confectionery peanuts are not
succeeding; more than 3/4 of the recent production had to be redirected to the oil processing
plants (Gaye, personal communication). Following the devaluation, Burkina Faso's share of the
green been market in France declined dramatically, due in large part to inefficiencies in the
management of the farmers' cooperative and an Air Afrique monopoly on air freight (many
management shortcomings appear to have been associated with government intervention)(Illy).
In sum, we have several examples of 'successful' closed programs for fertilizer inputs that have
become unsuccessful because of problems with other input markets, output markets, or contract3There is evidence that wealthier farmers owning larger farms do purchase fertilizer
without credit as do well-organized farmers who are able to reduce costs through collective
actions (e.g., some village associations in the OHVN area of Mali), but the low aggregate levels
of fertilizer use in SSA are testimony to the fact that the typical farmer is unlikely to use
fertilizer without substantially lower prices and/or access to credit.
9
enforcement.
A recent evaluation of the relative efficiency of the closed versus the open systems in Guinea
concluded that the closed systems were more efficient because they supplied appropriate inputs
in a timely manner while providing both credit and a guaranteed output market. Although the
closed systems received high marks for serving farmers, they are also providing clients with
direct or indirect subsidies, making it difficult for the open systems to compete. For example, the
SG 2000 program subsidizes the fertilizer transport costs and the HCR program distributes
fertilizer gifts which are often resold well below cost in local markets. In Guinea, we are left
with the same dilemma presented by the cotton companies discussed earlier%the closed systems
appear to serve specific groups of farmers more effectively at present than alternatives, but they
have characteristics that are constraining the development of input markets for other farmers and
crops.
3.2.2 Interlocking credit arrangements are substituting for social, political, and legal institutions
needed for market development 
Many analysts believe that rapid expansion of input use in SSA can only take place if farmers
have access to credit. The common argument is that rural incomes are so low that farmers are
unable to accumulate the money required for input purchases and leave that money tied up for a
period of 6 to 9 months.
3 
Interlocking credit arrangements have two important characteristics: (1) they provide farmers
with input credit and guaranteed output markets at prices generally announced at planting time
and (2) they provide the contracting institution (usually a processor and/or an exporter) with the
desired quantities of production and a high probability of credit repayment. In other words,
several of the major risks facing producers and processors/exporters are reduced when
interlocking credit arrangements are used.
Unfortunately, interlocking credit does not work for all types of crops.  In our opinion, the key
characteristic of successful interlocking credit systems in SSA is the absence of a parallel market
for the output. At present, cotton is one of the few subsectors in W. Africa where farmers are
unable to side market their production and thereby avoid repayment of the credit provided.
Similar conclusions are drawn from studies of cotton and sugar cane systems in East and
Southern Africa (Strasberg et al.). Even with cotton, there are examples of system failures when
side-markets developed (e.g., the case of cotton producers in Niger who sold their output across
the border in Nigeria). 10
With nascent horticultural export markets, it is also common to have interlocked credit
arrangements exhibiting high rates of repayment because there is usually a monopoly exporter
and prices in the domestic market are significantly lower than in the export market (e.g., green
beans in Mali and Burkina Faso). Evidence from East Africa suggests, however, that as demand
increases for horticultural niche crops, side-selling by farmers and side-purchasing by exporters
also increases, putting the entire system in jeopardy (personal communication from Ron Philips,
CLUSA, regarding paprika markets in Zambia).
Again we are left with a dilemma : Economic theory tells us that monopolies are generally
inefficient, but experience to date suggests that without monopoly output markets we are
unlikely to have financially sound input credit systems. It is our opinion that the missing element
here is the lack of social, political, and legal institutions that instill confidence in and respect for
contractual marketing arrangements%in the absence of these institutions, monopoly is the only
vehicle by which contractual arrangements can be enforced. 
Many defaults can legitimately be tied to crop failures, but far too many are associated with
moral hazard or situations where farmers are simply taking advantage of the system because
there are no serious penalties for doing so.  When input credit is considered a debt to the
government (as it is in most countries because private banks are unwilling to get involved),
politics play a prominent role in both government and farmer decision making. Governments are
likely to 'forgive' debts or to provide credit to all farmers (rather than to credit-worthy farmers)
when they think it will win them votes in an upcoming election. Farmers, on the other hand, are
likely to default on input debts as a way of compensating themselves for the government's (or
the marketing firm's) failure to provide adequate supporting services (e.g., output price
stabilization, basic extension services and  infrastructure). It has been observed that ...
Institutions, or rules of the 'economic game', consist of the generally accepted
codes of conduct and customs, as well as formal laws and regulations. Custom in
Africa puts great emphasis on behavior consistent with the support and
preservation of the extended family and clan....Customs well adapted to dealing
with short-run problems of household and village security are not always well
adapted to modern industry and commerce....Transactions costs are increased and
investments are avoided because of uncertain property rights and uncertain
enforcement of contracts, and a general ambiguity about existing policies,
regulations and their enforcement. (Shaffer and Wen, 1994). 
3.3 Progress in Promoting Inputs for Non-cotton Crops
3.3.1. The cotton/coarse grain link
Although W. African cotton schemes have often been portrayed as 'cotton-centric'%doing little to
promote food security%there is mounting empirical evidence to the contrary. One of the earliest
documented examples of a cotton company promoting cotton/maize complementarities in
production and input use began in the mid-1970s with the CMDT in the Sikasso Region of Mali.
Farmers were first encouraged to use rotations of cotton and maize so that the maize crop could11
benefit from the residual fertilizer carried over from the cotton crop. Maize fertilizer (urea) was
later made available on credit and for many years the cotton company purchased maize at
guaranteed prices from farmers producing surpluses (Dioné).   
In Guinea, most fertilizer (60-70%) is used on cotton, but the estimated 12% that is used on
maize, millet, and sorghum is used by farmers who have access to fertilizer through the cotton
companies (Debrah 1999).  
In the OHVN zone of Mali cotton production has been integrated with a strong program
promoting natural resource management practices. Farmers are trained in anti-erosion techniques
and methods of producing improved organic matter. This has enabled them to increase
production on fixed plots of land by rotating cotton, produced with inorganic fertilizers, and
maize or sorghum, produced with improved organic fertilizers. Many villages in the zone have
become surplus cereal producers during the last several years (Kelly).
3.3.2 Diversification into other fertilizer-responsive commercial crops
Sustained growth in W. African agriculture will require diversification to reduce the region's
heavy dependence on cotton for both farm income and government revenues. To the extent
possible, this diversification needs to include high value, fertilizer-responsive crops that
stimulate the level of demand for improved inputs needed to build competitive, sustainable input
markets. To date, efforts to diversify have been timid.
Irrigated and rainfed rice in Mali have the potential to help build input markets, but in both cases
it will be a constant battle to keep Malian rice competitive vis à vis Asian imports (Mariko,
Chohin, and Kelly; Dimithé). There are serious questions about the competitiveness of rice in the
Senegal River Valley where research is underway to find more profitable crops. Horticultural
production can also make a contribution to incomes (both rural and peri-urban) and input
demand. However, even in countries such as Senegal and Burkina with relatively strong exports
to European markets, and in Guinea and Mali where regional exports are important, horticultural
fertilizers represent a very small share of total fertilizer consumption.  
3.3.3 Increasing demand via  improvements in fertilizer efficiency
There has been a substantial amount of research in the Sahel on ways to improve fertilizer
efficiency by combining fertilizers with natural resource management practices that improve soil
organic matter, reduce erosion, and improve soil moisture. Although many of these techniques
produce promising results in research trials and closely supervised demonstration plots, farmers
have been slow to adopt the practices. An encouraging example of NRM adoption that has had
positive impacts on farm incomes and subsequent investment in productive assets is the NRM
program in the OHVN zone of Mali. The key to success was that NRM techniques were
introduced in a zone with a profitable cash crop (cotton) and in combination with extremely
successful CLUSA literacy and management training programs for farmers. Following an initial
period of literacy training, village technical teams are trained in NRM techniques, general
agronomic management practices, and financial management. In exchange for the training,
members of the teams agree to allocate one day per week to community activities (training other12
farmers in NRM techniques, organizing community work groups to build anti-erosion barriers,
managing village association credit programs, etc.) (Kelly).
3.4 Rationalizing Fertilizer Procurement to Reduce Costs
3.4.1 Consolidating Orders
The SSA fertilizer literature is replete with references to the high fertilizer prices associated with
very small volume imports. In Ghana, for example, the landed cost of sulphate of ammonia is
9% higher when ordered in a small 1,200 ton lot rather than in a 10,000 ton lot (Debrah 2000).
There is a need to examine economies that can be realized by consolidating both national and
regional fertilizer imports. Although the legal and political obstacles to regional coordination are
great, the benefits could be important for countries such as Niger and Burkina Faso whose
imports are already transiting ports in Ghana or for Mali whose imports come through Côte
d'Ivoire. A prerequisite for realizing economies of size and scale through consolidation of orders
is improving the market information system for inputs and providing training for importers so
they can better research cost-cutting options. There have been some timid efforts in this
direction, but more focused attention is needed .
3.4.2 Finding the appropriate role for in-kind input aid (e.g., KR2)
Many countries in W. Africa continue to receive in-kind input aid. Japan and the Dutch are two
of the principal donors. Inappropriate distribution systems for fertilizer aid can have negative
impacts on the development of local input markets. There is a consensus that the preferred
method of distribution is to discover prices through  auctions, yet many countries continue to set
prices based on some assumptions about acceptable markups and margins. This often results in
prices less than the costs incurred by private sector operators. Another frequent recommendation
for reform of KR2 is that the government use the receipts from KR2 sales to establish working
capital for an import credit fund that would be used by private sector suppliers.
3.5 Analyzing the Potential for Fertilizer Production Facilities
The proposed solution to high fertilizer costs in W. African is frequently some type of domestic
production, but analyses of the costs and benefits of establishing domestic fertilizer industries
are not very common.
3.5.1 Bulk blending
A bulk blending facility is already operating in Côte d'Ivoire and its products are being delivered
to other countries in the region (e.g., Mali, Guinea). The issue of building bulk-blending
facilities in other countries is frequently raised. It would be useful if some general guidelines for
making decisions about investing in bulk blending facilities or other types of fertilizer4The Soil Fertility Initiative (SFI) was launched in 1996 by the World Bank and FAO in
collaboration with ICRAF, IFDC, IFA, IFPRI, and USAID. The objective is to assist countries
in SSA to develop and implement country-specific strategies, action plans, and pilot projects to
restore and enhance soil fertility.
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production facilities were developed (perhaps with assistance from the Soil Fertility Initiative
4)
so governments could know if this were a feasible option.
3.5.2 Promotion of Phosphate Rock
The most researched and discussed option for reducing fertilizer costs has been the use of locally
produced rock phosphates. Studies on the costs and benefits of using rock phosphates have been
done in Mali and Burkina Faso. Results have led to ambivalent conclusions about the proper
course for governments to take. Although there is evidence of both private and social
profitability for rock phosphates, profits are generally greater for imported sources of phosphates
(DAP, TSP, etc.) (Phosphate Rock Support and Supervision Team; Henao and Baanante). 
Efforts to promote rock phosphates at the farm level have not met with strong success. Most
reports of phosphate rock programs indicate that farmers find the product too difficult to use. A
major national program of distributing rock phosphates at virtually no cost to farmers in Senegal
was introduced in 1997/98 and subject to a mid-term evaluation in 1999. The evalutation
(Sonko) notes that the first two years of the program suffered from a variety of design and
implementation problems related to technical, financial, and general administrative issues. The
report leaves the reader with the impression that very little was accomplished despite the high
costs of the program. Promotion of rock phosphates figures prominently in the soil fertility
action plan developed for Burkina Faso, but implementation is pending because donors have
been reluctant to take on the $25 million estimated costs of developing the production site,
purchasing 90,000 metric tons of rock phosphate and conducting 3,000 demonstration plots.
There are some who believe that all the attention that has been given to the promotion of rock
phosphates has kept governments from pursuing investments and policies that could redress soil
fertility problems more effectively and more efficiently (Sanders and Ahmed). 
3.6  Finding the Appropriate Role for Farmers Associations
Farmers' associations in W. Africa range from government created cooperatives to freely
associating groups of individuals. Farmers' associations have a role to play in the development of
input markets that will be serving them, but opinions vary as to what that role should be. A
report prepared as part of the Soil Fertility Initiative (SFI) for Ghana argues for replacing all
middlemen in the input sector with farmers' associations (Bonsu). A Niger report argues that the
functions now carried out by the government run "central d'approivissionment" should be
transferred to a cooperative of rice growers (the principal users of fertilizer). The role of farmers'
associations is variable across different cotton schemes, but in Mali farmers began managing the
collection and transport of cotton seed back in the 1970s; since then they have taken on
additional tasks related to input distribution and credit. In the irrigated rice zones of Senegal and14
Mali, farmers' associations have been the principal institution through which farmers access
credit and inputs; they have also played an important role in rice marketing.
The contribution that farmers' associations can make to both extension and input market
development is apparent in the OHVN. In sharp contrast to some earlier programs, the OHVN
does not impose associations on farmers but offers highly prized literacy and management
training programs to groups of farmers who voluntarily form associations with a clear set of
goals and objectives. OHVN villages where associations have been formed and members trained
are generally far ahead of others with respect to credit management (good access and high
repayment), crop management skills, use of NRM practices, crop yields and income (Kelly).
4. KEY CHALLENGES FOR SAHELIAN GOVERNMENTS 
4.1 Limiting negative impacts of monopolies
There are a number of situations in W. Africa where public or private monopolies continue to
play an important role in input markets or in output markets that have linked input credit
arrangements. The cotton sectors are the most pervasive example, but others have been noted
(the SENCHIM monopoly on fertilizer imports and distribution in Senegal, NOVASEN
monopoly on confectionery peanuts in Senegal, Sikassoise monopoly on potato inputs and
output marketing in the Sikasso Region of Mali, the monopoly on green bean input/export
market in the OHVN zone.).
Given the small size of fertilizer markets in most W. African countries, monopolies for fertilizer
production and imports could theoretically result in lower farm gate prices if the cost savings
from economies of size and scale were passed on to consumers. The evidence on where and
when this is happening is thin. In Mali, we know that the cotton company was able to provide
OHVN farmers with cheaper fertilizer than small independent traders but it is not clear if this is
due to economies of size/scale or to indirect subsidies. In Senegal, SENCHIM appears to be
charging unusually high import margins resulting in farm gate prices 20-30% higher than they
should be. In Ghana we have an example of cost savings from bulk imports (10,000 tons versus
1,200 tons) being passed on to farmers. In Guinea we have evidence of large price disparities
between the open and closed systems, but again much of the price difference appears to be due
to subsidies. In addition, there is evidence that the current system of multiple importers/dealers
in the very small open market sector is not efficient (poor timing of deliveries, inappropriate
products, poor geographic coverage, few provisions for credit). Niger presents a similar
picture%a plethora of small traders taking advantage of profitable opportunities that arise because
of policy changes (exchange rate, subsidy) in neighboring countries; the result is a chaotic
market that fails to meet the needs of Nigerien farmers. In 1998 the customs service registered
66 separate fertilizer imports; only 5 shipments were more than1,000 tons, 59% were less than
100 tons and 38% of the transactions were listed as "importateur occasionnel", suggesting that
many of the importers are not interested in building a stable, sustainable fertilizer import.
There is no easy answer to what level of competition is appropriate in emerging fertilizer15
markets. A common suggestion is to focus on developing competition at the wholesale and retail
levels first and then address the question of competition at the importation level once a market is
large enough to support several importers (Gregory, personal communication). This is probably
the most feasible approach, but it needs to be coupled with efforts on the part of the government
to limit rent seeking by the existing monopolies and to encourage the formation of larger firms
in countries where the current system is inefficient and costly.
With respect to the cotton monopolies, care must be taken to avoid the collapse in service
delivery experienced when structural adjustment programs moved rapidly to dismantle
government parastatals. Cotton is the most important single source of income for farmers
throughout much of W. Africa. It is also the most import single source of government revenue
for many countries (e.g., 50% of Malian government receipts come from the cotton sector).
Finally, it is the only subsector that has been able to develop an input credit system with
consistently high repayment rates. Apparently, Benin is poised to lead the way. The experience
needs to be carefully monitored so others can learn from it.
 
4.2 Limiting the negative impact of various types of subsidies and taxes 
There continue to be both direct and indirect fertilizer subsidies in W. Africa%the government-
supported farmers' associations (FASCOMs) in Ghana and Nigeria that compete unfairly with
private sector input dealers; the refugee and tree crop programs in Guinea that distribute free
inputs which are resold at prices well below the costs of private importers and distributors; the
rock phosphates distributed virtually free of change by the Senegalese Government; and
fertilizer aid (KR2) which is sold at government-determined rather than market-determined
prices in Niger and elsewhere.  
If a vibrant, competitive private sector is to be promoted, many of these practices need to be
better targeted or stopped entirely. Farmers' associations can play an important role in input
distribution and the management of input credit.  The role of the government should be to
provide training that enables the associations to perform these functions but it should not be to
subsidize their storage and transport costs%a common practice at present. 
Free distribution of fertilizer to disadvantaged groups can rarely be done without interfering with
existing markets; alternative methods of helping the disadvantaged need to be examined. Free
distribution of rock phosphates in Senegal has resulted in a very costly government program that
has been difficult to implement and shown few positive impacts. Rock phosphates could have a
role to play in restoring soil fertility in many regions of SSA, but without major progress being
made in farmers' annual use of both organic and inorganic fertilizers following a basal dose of
rock phosphates there is little hope that either the private or the social returns to national
phosphate programs will justify the costs (Sonko). 
Fertilizer aid needs to enter markets at competitive prices. The use of auctions will be a step in
the right direct if the auctions are conducted in an efficient and transparent manner.
Taxes are the flip side of subsidies. Substantial  progress has been made in reducing input costs16
by reducing or eliminating various taxes, but from 5-10% of the retail price of fertilizer is still a
result of taxes. The percent changes from year to year and is influenced by international
agreements (e.g., ECOWAS, UEMOA) as well as domestic considerations. Although there is
room for further reductions in this area, documents reviewed suggested that most governments
are already using tax reductions as a way of reducing input costs.
4.3 Regulating to stimulate rather than to constrain
In March 2000 the World Bank hosted a workshop on Agricultural Inputs Reglations: Issues and
Options for Sustainable Growth. The workshop addressed regulatory issues concerning both the
seed and fertilizer sectors. The focus was on designing regulations that avoid losses from both
over- and under-regulation. Table 8 summarizes some of the key issues and dangers associated
with input market regulation. 
Among the more important recommendations concerning the fertilizer sector were the need for
quality control, truth in labeling, and the removal of restrictions on types of fertilizers that can
be imported (with the exception of products containing heavy metals capable of contaminating
the environment). Implementation of such regulations would require better fertilizer testing
facilities and investment in farmer education to increase the benefits from improvements in
labeling and access to a broader range of products.
A common theme for both the fertilizer and seed sectors was the need to liberalize national
markets and harmonize regulations across national borders so that entrepreneurs will be able to
develop regional markets capable of realizing economies of size and scale. It was noted,
however, that harmonization without liberalization could leave regional and national markets
more closed than before if the harmonization were based on countries accepting the most
restrictive of the existing sets of regulations.
Another common theme was the issue of enforcement and what can realistically be done in
situations where the judicial system for contract enforcement is weak. Weak judicial systems, as
noted above, is also a problem faced by contract farmers (when the contractor defaults as in the
OHVN green bean situation) and for credit institutions (unable to enforce repayment or
collection of collateral).
4.4 Promoting regional collaboration/coordination
Numerous references to the potential benefits of moving toward regional rather than nation
markets were found in the documents reviewed, yet there is little concrete analysis of the cost
savings to be gained by regional markets and the legal and political barriers that would need to
be overcome. This seems like a task that could be effectively undertaken by the SFI support
group in collaboration with some of the major stakeholders (e.g., governments, national and
international input suppliers, the cotton companies, and farmers). Existing country assessments
and action plans contain a large share of the information needed for doing some preliminary
analyses of the possibilities for and constraints to developing regional markets. The proceedings17
(forthcoming) for the input regulation workshop mentioned above will provide some guidelines
for identifying constraints that need to be lifted.
This is a topic that needs more focused attention and analysis.
4.6 Reducing risk and uncertainty
Much of the discussion presented in earlier sections made references to the constraints imposed
on technology adoption and input market development by both price and production risks. We
also mentioned additional risks faced by lenders due to inadequate capacity to assess the
creditworthiness of  potential borrowers. The relative importance of these risks varies across
sectors (e.g., price risk is greater than production risk for producers of irrigated rice but the
reverse is true for cotton producers). There is also variability across countries as price risk is a
much greater factor for countries with volatile exchange rates and/or continued changes in input
subsidy policies (e.g., Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia) and for their neighbors (e.g., Benin, Togo,
Niger) whose input and output markets are influenced by price changes across the border.
Some of the most fundamental ways of reducing these risks are government investments in basic
services (infrastructure, basic education and agricultural extension, price information services,
etc.), macro-economic policies that stabilize exchange rates and tax/subsidy policies, and judicial
institutions that promote contract enforcement (Brooks). Another way government can assist is
to be transparent and consistent in the design and implementation of sectoral
policies%inconsistent or poorly understood policies increase uncertainty and discourage
investment by farmers and traders.
Our review identified some examples of risk-reducing programs that merit more attention. The
farmers' associations evolving in the OHVN zone appear to be reducing some of the risks
associated with managing agricultural credit as does the collaborative effort by the BNDA and
the FDV to build a joint data base on lenders in the Office du Niger. On the other hand, we
encountered numerous examples of credit risks rising when links between input, output, and
credit markets are severed. Learning how to reduce credit risks when input credit is no longer
linked to output marketing is probably the greatest challenge to input market development in W.
Africa.
Although not likely to provide any short run remedies for SSA, there is emerging interest in the
use of hedging through commodity markets and rainfall insurance to reduce price risk and help
spread production risk over a larger group of individuals (Skees, Hazell, and Miranda; Larson,
Varangis and Yabuki). At present both insurance and hedging appear to have more relevance for
middle income countries in Latin America and Asia, but it would be imprudent to discount them
entirely for SSA. Some small-scale efforts to examine alternative designs for these risk
instruments and test them would be appropriate BUT it should not be pursued as an alternative to
reducing risks through the more standard list of government actions noted above.18
5. MOVING FORWARD
5.1 The major challenge
The greatest input market challenge in W. Africa appears to be promoting an environment that
encourages private sector operators to realize the potential economies of scale so characteristic
of input markets (fertilizer in particular) while discouraging the development of monopolies that
do not pass on these economies to end users. 
For the cotton companies, we have seen small steps taken in various countries to liberalize and
or privatize some of the functions previously performed by the cotton company, but more needs
to be done to ensure that cotton farmers benefit from both the lowest possible input prices and
fair output prices. This must be done in a manner that does not put the credit system in jeopardy.
Another issue is whether further input cost reductions could be obtained by consolidating the
imports of cotton inputs with those for other sectors.
A different type of monopoly situation exists in Senegal where the fertilizer market continues to
be controlled by a monopolistic fertilizer manufacturer despite legislation that has liberalized the
import market. As in the cotton situation, it is important to break the monopoly without
destroying the benefits of the current system (e.g., good credit arrangements for wholesalers and
retailers).
For the many input markets that remain poorly developed and fragmented there is a need to
increase the incentives for suppliers to develop reliable, low-cost supplies of inputs to farmers
(versus the present system where costs are high and supplies erratic). One way of doing this is to
reduce the risk associated with input markets. Many suppliers are unwilling to deal with the
quantities required to realize economies of size and scale because of uncertainty about
government policies (e.g., free input distribution, changes in subsidies or exchange rates, etc.)
and uncertainty about demand, due largely to inadequate and changing input credit policies (the
latter being largely a result of poor contract enforcement).
These poorly developed and fragmented markets are found in countries with overall weak
effective demand for fertilizer as well as in the non-cotton sectors of countries with strong
fertilizer demand. In countries with weak effective demand, some consideration of regional
consolidation of imports organized by regional trade associations could reduce costs. A similar
approach organized by national trade associations might be appropriate for getting prices down
in the non-cotton sectors of countries with stronger aggregate demand. None of this will come
about, however, if something is not done to redress the lack of a reliable regulatory system (i.e.,
an honest, non-corrupted judiciary and bureaucratic/administrative system). In addition,
consistent input/subsidy policies could reduce the risk that keeps individual importers from
moving to larger volumes. Also, some actions that are taken by governments as part of general
macro-economic reforms (e.g., reductions in government debt or increased stability in exchange
rates) might contribute to a more favorable environment for input market development if they
freed up capital for private investment or reduced exchange rate risk for importers. 19
5.2 More Attention to Monitoring
Documents reviewed have done a good job of looking at aggregate numbers and subsector level
issues BUT there is still a lack of reliable information about why farmers are/are not taking up
improved inputs and why rural distributors are/are not stocking fertilizer, pesticides, and
improved seeds. We need to find a low-cost way of improving our knowledge of what is
happening at this level. One option is for the World Bank and major donors doing pilot projects
to set up good monitoring systems that will provide insights for the design of future market
development activities. Another that should not be overlooked is trying to help the many NGOs
who are already in the field promoting agricultural intensification and market development to
improve their reporting and monitoring so that information about their activities can be feed into
the policy process.
5.3 Governments Should Take Advantage of the SFI
This report would not have been possible without the many reports prepared as part of the Soil
Fertility Initiative. In countries that have already collaborated with SFI and completed the 
documentation of previous research and descriptions/evaluations of current distribution systems,
governments need to take a proactive role to begin the implementation of their action plans.
Donors have made it clear that there will not be large blocks of funding allocated for SFI (SFI,
1998), so the challenge is for governments to find creative ways of  mobilizing their own
resources to move ahead while they continue, with the support of SFI facilitators, to seek donor
support in the future. In countries that have not taken advantage of technical assistance and other
resources made available by the SFI to develop a soil fertility action plan, it appears to be
process that can contribute substantially to a country's understanding of the constraints and
opportunities faced in developing fertilizer markets and protecting natural resources.20








Observations on patterns and
incentives
Crop Region Typical Min Max Typical Min Max Min Max
Maize E/S Af. 17 2 52 5-7 3.9 13.9 1 15 Maize consumes about 25% of
fertilizer used in SSA but a high
percent of maize production
receives no fertilizer at all.
W. Af. 15 0 54 2-4 1.9 5.1 .69 26
L.A. 10 5 18 1-3 .01 7.1 1.2 5.3
Cotton E/S Af. 5.8 0 7 1.8 .07 4.6 .00 3.1 Accounts for about 17% of SSA
fertilizer use; a very large
percent of cultivated cotton area
is fertilized.
W. Af. 5 2 12 1.9 .09 3.7 .61 3.7
Rice (irr.) W. Af. 12 7 16 2 .2 4.5 1.6 3.97 Accounts for only 4% of SSA
fertilizer consumption.  Total
SSA area in rice is small % of
total cultivated area.
Asia 11 7.7 33.6 2.5 1.4 5 1.5 3.1
Sorghum E/S Af. 10 4 21 6 3.2 9.3 1.5 2.6 Accounts for 8% of fertilizer
used in SSA; very small portion
of total sorghum area is
fertilized.
W. Af. 7 3 14 2-4 1.4 4.9 1 18
Asia 7 2.8 21 2 1.7 2.6
Millet W. Af. 7 2.8 21 .5 39 Accounts for 3% of fertilizer
used in SSA; very small portion
of total millet area is fertilized. Asia 20 3 27 <1
Ground-
nuts
W. Af 9 4 21 3 .3 4.2 1.5 5.8 Accounts for 1% of fertilizer
used in SSA although a major
cash crop in many countries. Asia 6.5 6 17 1 .7 1.2
Coffee E. Af 8.5 5 10 Accounts for <1% of fertilizer
used.
W. Af 4 2 6
Tea E. Af 14 8 35 Accounts for <1% of fertilizer
used.
Source: Yanggen et al.
Notes: Information on V/C ratios was sparse and costs used in calculating ratios poorly documented, hence no attempt was made to generalize
about ‘typical’ V/C ratios. 21














Var (%) (kg/ha) (range)
Burkina 1984 65 4-5000 7-11
Côte d'Ivoire 1434 164
Mali 1669 80 5-5700 12-16
Niger 2390 246
Senegal 2362 83 4800-5600 9-16
Non-African
India 2777 43 3800-4900 9-10
Philippines 2919 4 5300-6800 13-14
Source: Yanggen et al. (appendix tables) and FAOSTAT yield data.22















Benin 1070 118 2700
Burkina Faso 1436 77
Cameroon 1485 239
Côte d'Ivoire 791 42 2726  9
Gambia 1335 114 2739 10
Ghana
  










Senegal 1056 102 1025 2
Non-African
Columbia 1593 55 2505 10
India 1607 75 2190 8.5
Indonesia 2355 88 2111 8
Source: Yanggen et al. (appendix tables), FAOSTAT yield data.23














Ghana 895 88 3-6.6  depending
on region
Côte d'Ivoire 1127 87
Gambia 568 273





Burkina Faso 988 112
Benin 1224 191
Cameroon 1192 89







Source: Yanggen et al. (appendix tables), FAOSTAT yield data, and Bonsu.24











Benin 18 21 + 6.1 19.6 +
Burkina Faso 13 8 - 13.1 21.9 +
Cameroon 0 12 + 42.0 22.6 -
Chad 9 8 - 5.0 7.7 +
Côte d'Ivoire -3 14 + 39.9 55.6 +
Gambia 0 5 + 2.4 0.7 -
Ghana -9 9 + 15.0 10.5 -
Guinea (C) 6 23 + 0.5 2.3 +
Guinea (B) -1 -8 - 0.5 0.3 -
Mali 4 15 + 17.6 22.8 +
Mauritania 24 -3 - 1.2 4.2 +
Niger -4 45 + 2.8 4.5 +
Nigeria 7 -17 - 266.7 291.3 +
Senegal -2 8 + 20.8 17.3 -
Sierra Leone -5 22 + 1.8 2.0 +
Togo 25 5 - 7.4 11.6 +
Source: FAOSTAT, 6/24/00.
Notes: Bold type indicates countries that appear to be moving to stage 3; 
Underline indicates countries in stage 1 with very small, rapidly growing 
markets; Italics indicate countries that have not regained pre-reform lev-
els of fertilizer use (Nigeria and Mauritania are in this category because 
they reached high consumption levels in the early 1990s that were fol-
lowed by sharp reductions).25
























Fraud Traders may deliberately
mislabel inputs or otherwise
provid false or misleading
information; this increases risk
fro farmers as they may act on
the basis of false and incomplete
information and thereby lose
money.
Government may interfere with
private trade in ways that cut
competition or raise trading costs.
Officials may use excess controls
and authority to sustain employment
in publid sector agencies, or even
extort bribes. In all of these cases,
controls boost farm-level input
prices.
Externalities Private decisions about what to
trade, plant, or apply on crops
may have impacts on
neighboring fields, the
environment, public health and
the sustainability of
infrastructure.
Government controls on what
people import, plant, or apply might
go beyond real risks of externalities,
and might block farmers' choices




Traders may know that some
inputs do not work well (low
quality or poor technology) but
may nevertheless sell them to
unknowing farmers.
Government controls on what
private traders are allowed to sell
can reduce farmer options, hurting
farmers as well as traders.
Introduction of
new technology
Farmers may lose money when
trying (or using) new
technology that does not
perform well.
Farmers may lose income from not
being allowed to use productive new
technology and/or technology







Public funds may be used to
compete for activities that can
be done more cost-effectively
by the private sector.
Excessive bureaucratic controls.
Source: Gisselquist, Nash, van der Meer (2000).27
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